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Federal Reserve’s Supply 
of Liquidity during 
the Financial Crisis
1. Introduction
ne of the primary questions associated with the recent 
financial crisis is how losses on subprime mortgage assets 
of approximately $300 billion1 led to rapid and deep declines in 
the value of a wide range of other financial assets and, 
increasingly, real economic output. The disproportionate 
amount of total losses compared with the relatively small size 
of the initial trigger points to the presence of amplification 
mechanisms that allowed losses centered in one market to 
cause a systemwide downturn. A further question is why 
subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in particular, 
rather than any other asset, led to the downturn. Identifying 
key factors leading to the crisis, Blanchard (2009) cites the 
interaction between general market conditions, such as high 
leverage, underpricing of risk, and high interconnectedness, 
and certain features of subprime MBS, such as opacity, as well 
as investors’ belief in ever-rising housing prices.2
1 See the International Monetary Fund’s “Global Financial Stability Report,” 
April 2008.
2 Acharya and Richardson (2009), Adrian and Shin (forthcoming), 
Brunnermeier (2009), and Gorton (2008), among others, also describe the 
genesis of the crisis and provide explanations for how it was propagated.
In this paper, we examine how the conditions identified by 
Blanchard and other researchers led to widespread losses in 
financial markets. Our study focuses on two financial 
amplification mechanisms of relevance to the crisis: balance-
sheet amplifiers and adverse-selection amplifiers.3 We also 
interpret the actions of the Federal Reserve in the context of the 
literature on financial amplification mechanisms as well as 
provide new empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the 
Fed’s liquidity supply during the crisis.
The balance-sheet mechanism is often cited as an 
explanation for liquidity crises. For example, it has been used 
to explain the stock market crash of 1987 (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen 2009), the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) 
crisis of 1998 (Gromb and Vayanos 2002), and the current 
crisis (Bernanke 2009). Indeed, the Bank of England 
incorporates this mechanism into its quantitative Risk 
3 For our discussion, a financial amplification mechanism represents the 
process whereby an initial shock occurring within the financial sector triggers 
substantially larger shocks elsewhere in the sector and in the real economy. A 
number of other mechanisms have been proposed in the literature. Examples 
are the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities (Diamond and Dybvig 
1983), Knightian uncertainty (Krishnamurthy forthcoming; Pritsker 2010), 
and interdependency from credit chains, whereby firms simultaneously 
borrow and lend (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997b).
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Assessment Model for Systemic Institutions, or RAMSI 
(Aikman et al. 2009). In all of these cases, the initial trigger was 
relatively small in magnitude and local (for example, the 
Russian default in 1998 and news associated with mergers and 
acquisitions in 1987), but the crisis spread rapidly and globally 
to other markets. The amplification underlying these events is 
understood to operate as follows: an initial shock tightens 
funding constraints, causing the net worth of institutions to 
decrease and funding conditions to tighten further. We discuss 
the different ways proposed in the literature for funding shocks 
to reduce net worth, such as higher margins, lower collateral 
value, lower asset market prices, and higher volatility. Since the 
literature is extensive, we focus on a small number of key 
contributions that introduce alternative feedback loops 
between funding shocks and changes in net worth (or, more 
generally, balance-sheet conditions).
Central banks appear well placed to mitigate funding 
constraints as lenders of last resort (LOLRs). Since banks 
typically fund long-term assets with short-term money, a loss 
of confidence would force them to engage in asset “fire sales.” 
By providing a liquidity backstop, central banks work to  
avoid potential fire sales. Bernanke (2009) describes the stages 
of the Federal Reserve’s responses to the current crisis. The 
first-stage programs—the Term Auction Facility (TAF), 
central bank liquidity swaps, the Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF), and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
(PDCF), all introduced between December 2007 and March 
2008 (see exhibit)—involved the provision of short-term 
liquidity to sound financial institutions, in line with the Fed’s 
traditional role of LOLR.4
We describe the Federal Reserve’s first-stage liquidity 
programs and discuss available evidence on their effectiveness. 
The evidence is consistent with the view that the Fed mitigated 
funding stresses by charging lower effective rates on 
collateralized funds compared with rates in the private market. 
The Fed was able to take such action because, as a patient 
investor, it required a lower liquidity risk premium than 
private lenders did.
Next, we focus on the adverse-selection mechanism, which 
differs from the balance-sheet mechanism in terms of the role 
played by credit risk. The balance-sheet mechanism focuses on 
“collateralizable” net worth (Bernanke and Gertler 1989) and 
secured financing. Here, while credit risk may trigger the initial 
funding shock, it plays no role in the amplification mechanism. 
Clearly, though, in addition to this balance-sheet effect, 
feedback from asymmetric information and credit risk is also a 
potentially important amplifier in crisis periods. Indeed, as the 
4 We do not consider the Fed’s term financing to JPMorgan Chase for the 
acquisition of Bear Stearns on March 14, 2008, to be a liquidity program, 
but rather a one-time transaction.
crisis evolved, concerns about the credit risk of financial 
institutions and bank capital came increasingly to the fore.
Amplifications from adverse selection appear to be 
particularly relevant in the later stages of a crisis. We provide a 
brief survey of the literature that focuses mainly on those effects 
and their explicit policy implications, particularly for the 
current crisis. The literature finds that when borrowers have 
private information about their own asset values, private 
funding markets may break down, as safe borrowers exit the 
markets and lenders, faced with an adverse selection of risky 
borrowers, reduce their lending. The market failure provides a 
role for liquidity supply by central banks. However, the 
literature is also skeptical of the efficacy of such intervention in 
the face of asymmetric information.
The Federal Reserve’s crisis interventions evolved along 
with the changing nature of the crisis. The second-stage 
programs—the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), the 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), the Money 
Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF), and the Term 
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), all rolled out 
starting in September 2008 (see exhibit)—went beyond 
providing liquidity and addressed the funding needs of 
borrowers in selected credit markets. With these facilities, the 
Fed accepted a certain amount of credit risk, which it managed 
through the imposition of haircuts on the collateral given to it. 
The increased credit risk that the Fed accepted is attributable to 
the longer maturity of the loans (up to five years for TALF 
loans, for example), the nonrecourse nature of the loans in the 
case of the AMLF and TALF, and the broader set of 
counterparties (any U.S. company with eligible collateral can 
borrow at the TALF, for instance). Given the relatively late date 
of the introduction of these programs, examination of the 
programs and their effectiveness remains at an early stage.
Our study concludes by providing fresh evidence on the 
effect of changes in the Federal Reserve’s supply of liquidity on 
changes in the three-month spread between the London 
interbank offered rate and the overnight indexed swap rate, 
better known as the Libor-OIS spread.5 In contrast to previous 
work that focuses on announcement date effects, our paper 
examines changes in the amount outstanding of funds supplied 
by the Fed through the TAF and the swap facilities. We control 
for credit risk, the uncertainty regarding credit risk, and 
liquidity risk, guided by the literature. We distinguish between 
periods of increasing and decreasing supplies of funds by the 
Fed, and find that increases tend to reduce interest rates during 
5 Libor is a benchmark unsecured interbank interest rate published by the 
British Bankers’ Association; OIS represents the expected average of the 
overnight fed funds rate over the term of the loan. The spread is widely used 
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periods of high funding liquidity risk. Surprisingly, decreases in 
the supply of funds also appear to be associated with lower 
spreads. Moreover, the impact of the funds supply on the 
spread has diminished over time, a result that is helpful in 
evaluating the impact of the Fed’s potential future exit from  
its liquidity programs.
2. The Balance-Sheet Amplification 
Mechanism
The literature on balance-sheet mechanisms focuses on the 
principal agent problem between borrowers and lenders that 
arises from delegated investment. Households invest in hedge 
funds and mutual funds that invest in securities; these funds 
may in turn invest with more specialized investors with 
expertise in sophisticated trading strategies.6 The principal 
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agent problem is defined as a deviation from first best 
outcomes associated with the necessity of external financing 
(Bernanke and Gertler 1989), and a consequence is that the 
intermediary’s investments come to depend on external 
financing terms and the intermediary’s balance-sheet 
conditions.
The balance-sheet amplification channel involves a positive 
feedback between funding constraints and changes in the asset 
values or cash flow of intermediaries. An early example is 
provided in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), who show how 
funding shocks reduce borrowers’ cash flows and impair their 
ability to finance investments from retained earnings, thereby 
increasing the cost of new investments. They propose a model 
in which borrowers have better information about project 
quality than potential lenders do.7 The resulting agency cost 
creates a wedge between the borrower’s costs of internal and 
external funds. Moreover, the external funds premium is 
greater when borrower net worth is lower, as in periods of 
financial distress. This inverse relationship arises because 
agency costs are higher when borrower cash flows are lower 
and consequently the external funds premium must be greater 
to compensate the lender. Reduced investments result in lower 
output and cash flows, creating a “financial accelerator” effect 
of cash flows on investments attributable to countercyclical 
agency costs.
In literature subsequent to Bernanke and Gertler, emphasis 
is placed on the effect of funding shocks on asset prices (instead 
of cash flows), which affects firm net worth through changes in 
the value of assets and liabilities (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997a; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Gromb and Vayanos 2002; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). Since asset prices are 
forward looking, persistent shocks that impact them can have 
potentially large wealth effects.
The generic balance-sheet constraint for time t can be 
expressed (following Krishnamurthy [forthcoming]) as:
(1) mtθt wt ≤ ,
where m is broadly interpreted as a “margin” requirement per 
unit of asset holding,θ  is the number of units of assets, and w 
is the value of equity capital. This interpretation of m is 
consistent with Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2009).8 In other words, the firm’s equity capital 
6 For example, the “Fund of Funds” strategy is used by hedge funds that invest 
in other hedge funds.
7 The superior information arises because the lender is assumed to pay a fixed 
auditing cost in order to observe the borrower’s realized return, whereas the 
borrower observes a return for free.
8 Margin constraints are perhaps the most common example of a balance-sheet 
constraint, but other constraints are possible. For example, in He and 
Krishnamurthy (2008), incentive conflicts limit the amount of coinvestment 
by outsiders in a mutual fund.
must be sufficient to cover its total margins. Higher margins 
reduce asset prices, which in turn lower w and cause the 
constraint to tighten further; this is the feedback loop between 
funding conditions and asset market prices.
An alternative interpretation of m is obtained from Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997a), in which lenders limit the debtor’s 
investments based on pledged collateral. Suppose that 
borrowers pledgeθ  units of assets to borrow γθP , where P is 
the asset price and γ 1 < . Then, the borrower’s budget 
constraint is:
(2) θtPt γθt ≤ Pt wt + .
Or, rewriting,
(3) 1 γ – () Ptθt wt ≤ .
Here,γ  can be viewed as the “haircut” on the collateral. If we 
write m 1 γ – () P = , then equations 3 and 1 are equivalent 
expressions of the budget constraint.
In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a), credit constraints arise 
because borrowers can only borrow against assets that can be 
pledged as security for the loan. The pledgable assets have a 
dual capacity: as factors of production and as collateral. An 
initial productivity shock reduces the net worth of constrained 
firms, resulting in lower investments and lower prices of 
pledgable collateral assets. As asset prices fall, constrained firms 
suffer a capital loss on their collateral asset, and the magnitude 
of this loss is large because of leverage. The subsequent 
reduction in borrowing capacity leads to further rounds of 
decreased investments, asset prices, and borrower net worth.
While Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997a) are concerned with “collateralizable” net 
worth, they acknowledge but do not consider the market 
liquidity of the collateral. This issue is addressed by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), and Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2009). These papers are also concerned with the 
two-way feedback between borrowing limits and asset prices 
present in Kiyotaki and Moore. However, they also introduce 
the idea of a positive feedback between funding illiquidity and 
market illiquidity. Funding illiquidity is the marginal investor’s 
scarcity value (or shadow cost) of capital; market illiquidity is 
the difference between the transaction price of a security and its 
fundamental value. The amplification mechanism discussed in 
these papers may be used to understand purely financial crises, 
independent of any effects on the real economy, such as the 
stock market crash of 1987 and the LTCM crisis of 1998.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) examine the effect of 
intertemporal wealth constraints on the incentives of 
arbitrageurs to eliminate mispricings between two securities 
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between arbitrageurs with specialized market knowledge, such 
as hedge funds, and the investors who fund them, such as 
wealthy individuals, banks, and endowments. If investors chase 
returns, they are likely to withdraw capital from arbitrageurs 
when prices are falling. In turn, arbitrageurs lacking capital are 
unable to reduce mispricing. This phenomenon is referred to as 
the “limits of arbitrage.”
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) provide a welfare analysis of 
competitive arbitrage. In the process, they formalize many of 
the intuitions of Shleifer and Vishny (1997). The possibility of 
arbitrage arises because of segmented asset markets: some 
investors are able to invest in one risky asset but not in another 
(identical) risky asset. Arbitrageurs can invest in both assets 
and act as intermediaries: by exploiting price discrepancies, 
they facilitate trade among investors, effectively providing 
liquidity to them. Thus, arbitrage activity benefits all investors. 
It is assumed that arbitrageurs must have separate margin 
accounts for the two assets (that is, there is no cross-
margining).9 This implies that arbitrageur positions are wealth 
constrained. Gromb and Vayanos show that if changes in 
arbitrageur wealth are insufficient to cover variations in both 
margin accounts, arbitrageurs may be unable to take a position 
large enough to eliminate price discrepancies. Further, 
arbitrageurs may choose not to invest up to their wealth 
constraint if the capital gain from the arbitrage position is 
expected to be risky.10 They can also increase price volatility by 
liquidating their positions in the event that price discrepancies 
widen further.
The feedback loop in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a) and 
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) may be called an illiquidity spiral: 
reductions in collateral values result in lower asset prices and 
further reductions in collateral values. In terms of equation 3, 
the feedback is betweenθP  and w, for given m. By comparison, 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) derive a margin spiral, in 
which lower asset prices reduce arbitrageur net worth through 
higher margins. In terms of equation 1, the feedback is between 
m and w, for given θ . While this distinction is useful for 
expositional reasons, changes in m andθ are clearly 
interdependent.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen examine the relationship 
between margin conditions and market illiquidity. In their 
model, customers with offsetting demand shocks arrive 
sequentially to the market. Speculators smooth the temporal 
order imbalance and thereby provide liquidity. The speculators 
9 The authors argue that this assumption captures the notion that a custodian 
of the margin account in one market might refuse to accept a position in a 
different market as collateral. This assumption may not hold in all asset 
markets, however. For example, an arbitrageur with a simultaneous position in 
Treasury spot and futures markets generally cannot cross-margin.
10 This follows from the possibility that the price discrepancy may grow wider 
and result in capital losses for arbitrageurs.
borrow using collateral from financiers who set margins 
(defined as the difference between the security’s price and its 
collateral value) to control their value-at-risk. Financiers can 
reset margins every period, so speculators face funding 
liquidity risk from the possibility of higher margins or losses on 
existing positions. A margin spiral occurs as follows: Suppose 
markets are initially highly illiquid and margins are increasing 
in market illiquidity.11 A funding shock to speculators lowers 
market liquidity and results in higher margins, which cause 
speculators to delever, further tightening their funding 
constraints. Therefore, market liquidity falls even further.
There is no default risk in balance-sheet models, as loans are 
fully collateralized.12 Thus, amplification works through fund 
flows and liquidity risk. The fact that inefficiencies can arise in 
the absence of credit risk suggests the positive role of central 
banks in alleviating funding and capital constraints during 
periods of crisis.
3. The Balance-Sheet Amplification 
Mechanism: Implications 
for Central Banks
The welfare analysis of Gromb and Vayanos (2002) shows that 
arbitrageurs may not take on an optimal level of risk, in part 
because they fail to internalize the effect on prices of changing 
their positions.13 For example, arbitrageurs may underinvest in 
an arbitrage opportunity because they do not consider the 
possibility that larger positions in the current period would 
reduce price discrepancies in future periods. Thus, the key 
source of allocative inefficiency is the negative externality from 
changes in an arbitrageur’s positions on other arbitrageurs.
11 This occurs if financiers are unsure if price changes are attributable to news 
shocks or liquidity shocks, and if volatility is time varying. Under these 
conditions, liquidity shocks lead to higher volatility, which increases financiers’ 
expectations of future volatility; this in turn leads to higher margins. In 
contrast, if financiers know for sure that price changes are linked to 
fundamental news shocks, they realize that prices will revert in the future, 
making arbitrage positions in the current period profitable. This reduces the 
incentives of financiers to increase margins when liquidity decreases.
12 This is explicit in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a). Bernanke and Gertler (1989) 
explain that their model is about “collateralizable” net worth. The models of 
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) rule out 
default because margin accounts must be fully collateralized. 
13 An important reason why arbitrageur position changes are “Pareto-
improving”—that is, they make some people better off without making anyone 
worse off—is that price changes result in wealth redistributions, and market 
segmentation implies that agents’ marginal rates of substitution differ (as 
shown by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1986] in a general, incomplete 
market setting). Arbitrageurs prefer to receive more wealth earlier while other 
investors prefer to receive wealth later; this creates the potential for Pareto-
improving wealth redistributions across time and states.60 Financial Amplification Mechanisms
An implication of Gromb and Vayanos is that regulatory 
intervention may affect arbitrageurs’ financial constraints by 
reducing their capital and margin requirements or by 
providing financing to those institutions that provide capital to 
arbitrageurs.14 Since the ex ante choice of leverage may be 
suboptimal, there is scope for prudential capital and liquidity 
requirements and, more generally, regulation of financial 
sector balance sheets. In addition, ex post policy actions to 
address the allocative inefficiency should be welfare improving, 
although they need not be unanimously approved (because of 
distributional effects).
In Bernanke and Gertler (1990), the optimal policy is a 
“debtor bailout,” whereby the government redistributes 
endowment (via lump-sum taxes) from lenders to borrowers 
until the agency cost disappears. The policy works by directly 
addressing the problem of low net worth of borrowers 
(financial firms such as brokers, banks, and clearinghouses). 
Further, such transfers need not be direct, rather, they could be 
channeled through financial intermediaries under the 
assumptions that the latter can identify legitimate borrowers 
and that the government ensures that funds are channeled to 
successful projects. The moral-hazard problem is addressed by 
recommending bailouts only in response to large aggregate or 
systemic shocks over which borrowers have no control.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) discuss the ability of 
central banks to enhance market liquidity by controlling 
funding liquidity. If a central bank is effective at distinguishing 
news shocks and liquidity shocks and it conveys this distinction 
to financiers, the financiers may ease their margin 
requirements. Alternatively, the central bank can directly ease 
speculator funding conditions during a crisis, either by 
providing emergency funding at lower margins or simply by 
stating its intention to do so. If the statement is credible, 
financiers may loosen margin requirements, because their 
worst-case scenarios have a lower probability of occurring.15
14 When regulators have limited control over financial constraints, they may 
prefer to tighten them in some cases to reduce overinvestment (for example, by 
limiting entry into the arbitrage industry). Overinvestment occurs if 
arbitrageurs are initially fully invested in the arbitrage opportunity. If demand 
by other investors increases, the price discrepancy widens and arbitrageurs 
suffer capital losses on their current positions. If arbitrageurs reduce their 
positions, they limit losses and can provide liquidity in future periods by 
trading more aggressively, a practice that mitigates the price wedge.
15 Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) provide another rationale for central bank 
intervention. When markets are incomplete, the authors show that the price of 
the long-lived asset may exhibit excessive volatility. By using open market 
operations appropriately to set interest rates, the central bank can prevent the 
price volatility and implement the constrained efficient solution. Thus, the 
central bank effectively completes the market, and open market operations are 
sufficient to address systemic liquidity crises.
4. The Federal Reserve as Lender 
of Last Resort during the Early 
Stages of the Crisis
We turn to an assessment of the Federal Reserve’s ex post 
interventions during the financial crisis, viewed in the context 
of the balance-sheet literature. From equations 1 and 3, we 
observe that a regulator has three types of instruments at its 
disposal:
￿r e d u c i n g   m, the required margins on new funds;
￿i n c r e a s i n g   γ, the value of pledgable assets;
￿i n c r e a s i n g   w, the equity capital.
We focus on the Fed’s efforts to reduce m and increaseγ  
during the early stages of the crisis. Traditional LOLR policies 
advocate lending to solvent institutions against good collateral at 
a penalty rate (Rochet and Vives 2004). However, Cecchetti and 
Disyatat (2010) argue that, when there is generalized market 
failure, it may not make sense to provide liquidity at a penalty 
rate over the market rate because no institution benefits relative 
to others. The authors conclude that “liquidity support will 
often, and probably should, be provided at a subsidized [relative 
to the market] rate when it involves an illiquid asset in which a 
market price cannot be found.”
Normally, the Fed provides reserves to a small number of 
primary dealers that distribute the funds to banks via interbank 
markets; in turn, banks lend to ultimate borrowers. When the 
markets are disrupted, the Fed relies on the discount window 
facility to provide short-term backup funding to eligible 
depository institutions. In the current crisis, interbank markets 
were dysfunctional, especially for term lending. The Fed 
encouraged banks to borrow from the discount window, but 
the banks were reluctant, perhaps in part because of the 
“stigma” associated with such borrowing.16
Responding to these concerns, the Fed introduced a number 
of programs (the aforementioned stage-one group) between 
December 2007 and March 2008 designed to provide short-
term liquidity to sound financial institutions.17 In the context 
of the balance-sheet literature, the programs can be viewed as 
easing balance-sheet constraints and thereby breaking the 
illiquidity spiral. An example is the TSLF, which allows dealers 
to exchange illiquid securities (say, MBS) for liquid Treasury 
securities that the dealers can subsequently use as collateral to 
16 For example, Furfine (2003) presents evidence consistent with potential 
borrowers staying away from the discount window, perhaps out of concern 
that such borrowing would be viewed as a sign of higher credit risk. Armantier 
et al. (2010) provide evidence that a discount window stigma existed 
throughout the financial crisis.
17 See Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews (2008), Adrian, Burke, and 
McAndrews (2009), and Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2009) for descriptions of the 
TAF, PDCF, and TSLF programs, respectively. For descriptions of other Federal 
Reserve programs, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2010 61
Chart 1
Liquidity Risk during the Financial Crisis
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Haver Analytics.
Notes: MBS is mortgage-backed securities. Full names of the liquidity
facilities appear in the exhibit on page 57.
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borrow funds. The dealer pays a smaller haircut (say, 
H_Treasury) when borrowing against liquid Treasuries than 
what it pays (say, H_Illiquid) when borrowing against illiquid 
securities. Of course, the TSLF also charges a haircut (say, 
H_TSLF). However, as long as H_TSLF < (H_Illiquid - 
H_Treasury), the facility lowers the dealer’s net funding costs. 
Thus, the TSLF may be viewed as increasingγ  in equation 3.
Other stage-one programs may be viewed as breaking the 
margin spiral (reducing m in equation 1). For example, the 
TAF auctioned credit to eligible depository institutions for a 
term of twenty-eight days initially and up to eighty-four days 
by August 2008. A similar program, the PDCF, issued credit to 
primary dealers. The international counterpart to TAF is 
bilateral currency swap arrangements with foreign central 
banks, which allow the banks to provide dollars to institutions 
in their own jurisdictions. These programs may bring down m 
in two ways: They may provide financing when private 
financing is simply unavailable, or when private financing is 
available only at more expensive terms.
How effective were these programs in reaching their 
objectives? To answer this question, we examine one liquidity 
risk proxy: the spread between overnight repo rates on MBS 
and Treasury securities.18 Because both MBS and Treasury 
repo loans are collateralized and are issued for a short 
(overnight) maturity, the spread between them mainly reflects 
the relative illiquidity of the two assets. In particular, during the 
crisis, investors sought safety in the Treasury market while 
agency MBS became relatively illiquid, leading to an increase in 
the spread between agency MBS and Treasury repos.19 The 
repo markets are important for bank financing (Hordahl and 
King 2008). In addition, if the secured financing market is 
stressed, it is highly likely that the unsecured financing market 
is also under duress. For these reasons, the MBS-Treasury repo 
spread provides a good proxy for funding illiquidity in the 
economy, not just in the secured financing markets.
The source for the MBS-Treasury spread data is the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York’s primary dealer survey. The Trading 
Desk at the New York Fed collects information each morning 
from dealers on the average overnight general collateral repo rate 
at which each dealer has financed its positions in Treasury 
securities, agency debt securities, and agency MBS, as well as the 
quantity of securities financed. An overall weighted average is then 
calculated for each collateral type.
18 Overnight repo rates on MBS are general collateral repo rates that reference 
nonspecific government securities with the lowest level of counterparty risk 
(Hordahl and King 2008). In contrast, specific collateral rates reference 
particular types of collateral, such as an on-the-run bond. 
19 Brunnermeier (2009) uses the repo spread (although not of the overnight 
maturity) to illustrate liquidity risk during the financial crisis. Gorton and 
Metrick (2009) discuss the role of repo markets during the crisis.
Providing evidence on the effectiveness of the TSLF and 
PDCF programs, the spread between overnight agency MBS 
repo rates and Treasury collateral repo rates decreased after the 
TSLF program was implemented (Chart 1). Fleming, Hrung, 
and Keane (2009) show that this reduction is statistically 
significant. They further show that the narrowing of the repo 
spread is primarily attributable to increases in the Treasury 
repo rate and less so to decreases in the MBS repo rate. 
However, as the authors note, increases in the Treasury repo 
rate are important for the liquidity of the market.20 Since the 
overnight repo spread may be attributable to the reduced 
collateral value (from lower market liquidity) of MBS relative 
to Treasuries, or to the increased collateral value of Treasuries 
(from higher market liquidity) relative to MBS, the reduction 
in the spread suggests an increase in γ .
The top panel of Chart 2 shows the difference between the 
Libor, which is taken to be the benchmark borrowing rate in 
the private markets, and the discount window borrowing rate 
(the primary credit rate).21 The discount window rate was 
20 Treasury securities are widely used as collateral for secured funding, so 
improved liquidity for Treasuries is likely to have a beneficial effect on secured 
funding rates in general. In addition, Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2009) observe 
that an “unusually low Treasury general collateral repo rate puts downward 
pressure on repo rates for individual Treasury securities, increasing the 
likelihood of settlement problems” (also see Fleming and Garbade [2004, 2005]).
21 The Libor is used for unsecured funding while the prime rate and the stop-
out rate are used for secured funding. However, much of the collateral posted 
to the Fed was illiquid and could not be used to obtain secured funding 
elsewhere. Therefore, the Libor closely approximates the opportunity cost of 
funds for TAF participants.62 Financial Amplification Mechanisms
Chart 2
Cost of Borrowing from the Federal Reserve































Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Haver Analytics; British 
Bankers’ Association; Bloomberg.
Notes: Libor is the London interbank offered rate. Solid circles represent 
the one-month Libor–twenty-eight-day TAF stop-out spread; open circles 
represent the three-month Libor–eighty-four-day TAF stop-out spread. 
For twenty-eight-day TAF auctions, the Libor-TAF spread is calculated as 
the spread between the one-month Libor and the twenty-eight-day TAF; 
for eighty-four-day TAF auctions, the spread is calculated as the spread 
between the three-month Libor and the eighty-four-day TAF. Full names 
of the liquidity facilities appear in the exhibit on page 57.
initially above the Libor, a development that partly explains 
banks’ reluctance to use the window early in the crisis. The 
bottom panel of the chart illustrates the difference between the 
Libor and stop-out rates in the twenty-eight- and eighty-four-
day TAF auctions. It shows that the Libor generally exceeded 
the stop-out rates, indicating that the Fed was successful in 
providing credit at below-market rates. In addition, evidence 
indicates that the TAF and the swap line programs reduced 
interest rate spreads.22
The Federal Reserve’s success in easing funding constraints 
during the crisis likely had a beneficial effect on the real 
economy, via the channels suggested in Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a). Del Negro et al. 
(2009), who extend the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), 
study the impact of a large shock of the order of magnitude 
observed in the 2008 financial crisis. Their model simulations 
suggest that the Fed’s policy interventions in 2008-09 
prevented a repeat of the Great Depression.
5. The Adverse-Selection 
Amplification Mechanism: 
Implications for Central Banks
The Federal Reserve’s first-stage liquidity programs exposed it 
to minimal credit risk. The Fed’s loans to banks and primary 
dealers through the various facilities are overcollateralized and 
made with recourse to the borrowing firm.23 In the case of the 
currency swap lines, the foreign central banks are responsible 
for payments; moreover, the Fed receives and holds an 
equivalent amount of foreign exchange for the dollars it 
provides to the central banks.
As the crisis evolved, concerns about the credit risk of 
financial institutions and bank capital came increasingly to the 
fore. The Fed’s stage-one programs were dependent on solvent 
institutions to intermediate credit flow from the central bank 
to the economy.24 As these intermediaries themselves became 
impaired, they were less willing to lend. In addition, certain 
credit markets, such as commercial paper, were particularly 
afflicted. Consequently, the Fed decided to lend directly to 
some affected borrowers and markets. Thus, with its second-
stage programs, the Fed was forced to take on and manage a 
certain amount of credit risk.
To understand the intent behind these programs, we 
examine amplification mechanisms based on asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lenders. In contrast to our 
22 McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) study the effect of the TAF on the 
Libor-OIS spread. McAndrews (2009) and Coffey, Hrung, and Sarkar (2009) 
analyze the effect of swap lines: the former on the Libor–fed funds spread, the 
latter on deviations from covered interest rate parity. Cetorelli and Goldberg 
(2009) examine the effect of liquidity programs on the internal capital markets 
of global banks.
23 For a description of the required collateral, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
monetarypolicy/bst_ratesetting.htm.
24 The Federal Reserve’s objective was to improve the distribution of liquidity 
across financial intermediaries, as stated in its announcement of the TAF 
program on December 12, 2007 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/monetary/20071212a.htm). This objective could not have been achieved 
by way of a generalized injection of liquidity, such as through the purchase of 
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review of balance-sheet amplifiers, we focus here on the role of 
credit risk and the distribution of credit risk across borrowers. 
The papers surveyed in this discussion find a role for central 
bank intervention when adverse-selection problems lead to 
market breakdowns. However, they also raise concerns that 
central bank liquidity provision might crowd out private 
market liquidity.
Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2009) build a model of 
the effect of counterparty risk on unsecured interbank markets 
with asymmetric information.25 Banks need liquidity, as 
customers may withdraw deposits on demand (as in Diamond 
and Dybvig [1983]). The interbank markets distribute funding 
from banks with excess reserve balances to those with reserve 
shortages. Counterparty risk exists because banks have risky 
long-term assets and may be unable to repay their interbank 
loans. Asymmetric information about counterparty risk exists 
because banks have private information about the riskiness of 
their long-term assets.
The authors show that different regimes occur in the 
interbank markets depending on the level and distribution of 
counterparty risk. Because lenders cannot distinguish between 
safe and risky banks, the interest rate contains a risk premium. 
In the “good” regime, the risk premium is small compared with 
the opportunity cost of funds, so the interbank markets 
perform smoothly with low interest rates. If, however, the risk 
premium is too high, safe borrowers exit the interbank 
markets. Consequently, in this “worst” regime, lenders face an 
adverse selection of risky borrowers and the interest rate is 
high. In this regime, both the level and the dispersion of credit 
risk are high;26 as a result, the interbank markets stop 
functioning. Either lenders find it unprofitable to lend (even at 
high interest rates) and thus hoard funds,27 or risky borrowers 
find the interest rate too high and exit.
What are the implications of this model for central bank 
liquidity supply? 28 Suppose credit risk increases unexpectedly 
and lenders face an adverse selection of borrowers (but the 
market is still functioning). If the central bank has the same 
information as the market, it can offer liquidity to all banks at 
the highest interest rate that safe banks are willing to accept. As 
25 Flannery (1996) also studies asymmetric information problems and 
identifies a “winner’s curse” facing new lenders in banking markets. He shows 
that private loan markets can fail because lenders become less certain about 
how to distinguish between illiquid and insolvent banks.
26 If ps pr ()  is the probability that the long-term investment has a higher- 
(lower-) than-expected chance of success, dispersion is defined as ps pr – .
27 Liquidity hoarding can also arise if banks fear that they will be unable to 
finance projects and trading strategies because of uncertainty in the aggregate 
demand for liquidity (Allen, Carletti, and Gale 2009). In such a case, central 
bank intervention may not be needed because banks hold sufficient liquidity to 
meet their own needs without accessing the interbank markets (Allen and 
Carletti 2008).
in Flannery (1996), this rate is discounted relative to the market 
rate, and the central bank’s supply of liquidity mitigates the 
private liquidity shortage. The cost is that the central bank does 
not distinguish between sound and risky institutions, a concern 
also raised by Goodfriend and King (1988). Moreover, the 
private supply of liquidity is crowded out.
Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2009) also raise the 
possibility that central bank liquidity crowds out private 
liquidity.29 Their model features two types of investors: short-
run investors, who invest in valuable risky projects that 
typically mature early, and long-run investors, who invest in 
higher return long-term assets. The ex ante efficient solution is 
for short-run investors to sell risky assets to long-run investors 
(to obtain “outside” liquidity) and for trading not to occur too 
quickly. However, short-run investors have private 
information about the assets. If investors are concerned about 
adverse-selection problems that may undermine secondary 
markets in the future, they may trade too soon and at fire-sale 
prices.
A central bank may step in and provide liquidity (in the 
form of price support) to mitigate the fire sale. The 
effectiveness of liquidity supply depends on whether the central 
bank can accurately time the supply. If it delays liquidity 
provision, it crowds out outside liquidity and undermines the 
incentives of short-run investors to obtain outside liquidity by 
selling assets for cash. However, if the central bank acts quickly, 
its liquidity can complement private market liquidity. In this 
case, the central bank plays the role of market maker of last 
resort by inducing short-run investors to obtain liquidity 
through asset sales.
28 There is a vast literature on central bank or government intervention to 
address market failures in the face of asymmetric information, moral hazard, 
and monopoly power. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Diamond and Rajan 
(2005) analyze the optimal (central bank) provision of liquidity when 
interbank markets face aggregate liquidity shocks and contagious failures 
generated by the illiquidity of bank assets. Gorton and Huang (2006) 
rationalize the LOLR function of central banks with the need to monitor banks 
and provide them with liquidity during crises in order to prevent inefficient 
panics. Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2008) examine how the strategic 
power of an interbank lender might force a liquidity-constrained borrower to 
sell at fire-sale prices. The strategic power is the market failure that justifies 
central bank intervention.
29 Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2009) build on the literature that integrates 
financial intermediaries and securities markets in a single framework. In 
Diamond (1997), banks coexist with securities markets because households face 
costs associated with switching between banks and securities markets. Fecht 
(2004) introduces segmentation on the asset side between financial 
intermediaries’ investments in firms and claims issued directly by firms to 
investors through securities markets. Allen and Gale (2004) introduce securities 
markets into a general-equilibrium theory of institutions. Intermediaries provide 
liquidity insurance, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and risk-sharing services 
by packaging existing claims for investors that lack access to markets. The 
financial system is efficient as long as markets are complete.64 Financial Amplification Mechanisms
6. Adverse Selection and the Fed’s 
Actions during the Later Stages 
of the Crisis
The Fed’s second-stage programs were designed to provide 
funding in a targeted manner to borrowers and investors in key 
credit markets (Bernanke 2009). These programs, rolled out 
starting in September 2008, came in two varieties (see exhibit). 
Continuing its LOLR role, the Federal Reserve provided a 
liquidity backstop to money market mutual funds and to 
commercial paper borrowers. The Fed developed a facility to 
finance bank purchases of high-grade asset-backed commercial 
paper from money market mutual funds, which helped the 
funds to meet redemption demands without having to sell 
assets at distress prices. Through another facility, the Fed 
bought high-quality (A1-P1) commercial paper at a term of 
three months, which reduced the risk of commercial paper 
borrowers being unable to roll over maturing issues.
The second type of Federal Reserve programs went beyond 
providing liquidity to address the funding needs of borrowers 
in selected asset-backed markets. The TALF, representing a 
joint effort with the U.S. Treasury, provides three- or five-year 
term loans to investors against (mostly) new issuances of AAA-
rated securities. With the Treasury providing funding, the 
facility allows the Fed to accept a certain amount of credit risk. 
The Fed manages the credit risk through the imposition of 
haircuts on the collateral put to it. The objective of the program 
is to revive private lending by enabling lenders to securitize new 
loans. In addition, by stimulating market activity, the facility 
potentially increases the valuation of existing loans by reducing 
the illiquidity premium.
The design of the TALF program appears to address the 
concern that the Fed might crowd out the private supply of 
liquidity in the affected markets. The program leverages private 
originations of asset-backed securities, consistent with Bolton, 
Santos, Scheinkman (2009). Further, it offers funding at 
different rates for various asset classes (as the haircuts differ by 
asset). This feature appears to alleviate the moral-hazard 
problems inherent in offering a flat rate to all investors 
independent of credit risk, a concern raised by Goodfriend and 
King (1988) and Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2009).
Given the relative newness of these programs, rigorous 
empirical evidence on their effectiveness is scarce. An 
exception is Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2009), who 
report the results of a survey of financial institutions on how 
the institutions’ bid prices for securities depend on Federal 
Reserve financing. The Fed, by offering loans at lower margins 
than the market, effectively lowers the required return for 
holding securities put to the TALF. Consistent with this idea, 
the surveyed bid price increases as the Fed reduces its offered 
margins. This evidence is consistent with the expected effect of 
lower margins on asset prices.
7. Evolution of Credit and Liquidity 
Risk during the Crisis
As the crisis progressed, the relative importance of the balance-
sheet and adverse-selection mechanisms likely changed. This 
evolution is implicit in the timing of the Fed’s responses. In 
particular, the Fed’s stage-one programs emphasized the 
provision of liquidity to solvent institutions, suggesting that at 
this early point in the crisis the Fed viewed a lack of access to 
funding as a greater risk to the economy than counterparty 
credit risk. In contrast, the second-stage programs reflected the 
Fed’s views on the increasing importance of credit risk. In this 
section, we estimate proxies for liquidity risk, credit risk, and 
the distribution of credit risk across banks to examine the 
changing importance of the financial amplification 
mechanisms over time.
The adverse-selection effects operate via credit risk 
and its distribution across banks (Heider, Hoerova, and 
Holthausen 2009). The credit risk measures considered here 
are the CDX IG index of credit default swap (CDS) spreads and 
the dispersion in Libor panel quotes. The CDX IG index, 
provided by Markit, is composed of spreads on five-year CDS 
contracts for 125 North American companies; it provides 
information on the average default risk of major global firms. 
Because the index tends to rise with increases in the level of 
economy-wide credit risk, we expect a positive relationship 
between the index and adverse selection.
The Libor panel dispersion, provided by the British Bankers’ 
Association via Bloomberg, is defined as the difference between 
the maximum and minimum three-month quote of the sixteen 
Libor panel banks each day; it proxies for uncertainty about 
counterparty credit risk. The quote dispersion shows the extent 
to which some Libor panel banks report greater borrowing 
costs, an indicator of higher counterparty risk compared with 
the typical Libor panel bank. Our uncertainty measure is 
consistent with those proposed in Heider, Hoerova, 
Holthausen (2009) and Pritsker (2010), that is, the spread in 
default probabilities assigned by lenders to a borrower’s 
investments. Again, the expected relationship between the 
quote dispersion and adverse selection is positive.
Balance-sheet effects operate according to illiquidity and 
margin conditions. To measure liquidity risk, we use the spread 
overnight MBS and Treasury general collateral repo rates. As 
discussed in Section 4, the spread between these two rates 
should primarily reflect the relative illiquidity of MBS relative FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2010 65
Chart 3




















Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Haver Analytics, Markit; British Bankers’ Association.
Notes: MBS is mortgage-backed securities; Libor is the London interbank offered rate. The overnight MBS–Treasury repo spread is the liquidity risk proxy; 
the CDX spread and the Libor quote dispersion are the credit risk proxies. Full names of the liquidity facilities appear in the exhibit on page 57.
to Treasuries. The credit risk component of these two rates is 
minimal because of the secured nature of the transaction, the 
short duration of the loan, and haircuts that are generally set in 
advance. In contrast, the daily repo rate on a given day reflects 
supply and demand pressures in the market. During the 
financial crisis, there was a rush to buy Treasuries, which 
increased the demand for these securities. The greater demand 
likely lowered the risk of a repo buyer being unable to sell the 
Treasuries in the event of counterparty default. Impairment in 
the MBS market, however, meant that the same was not true for 
buyers accepting MBS securities as collateral. Therefore, the 
differences in these two rates reflect the ability of buyers to 
quickly and easily sell the collateral from their repo 
transactions—in other words, the two securities are relatively 
liquid. We compare these series to the three-month Libor-OIS 
spread, which contains credit and noncredit risk premia. 
Arbitrage should normally ensure that the spread is close to 
zero, but the spread has widened dramatically during the crisis 
(Chart 2).30 The variable considered here takes Libor quotes 
reported on day t+1 and the OIS rate reported on date t, both 
at a term of three months. We use t+1 Libor rates because the 
rate is fixed each morning at 11:00 a.m. London time while the 
30 The arbitrage works as follows: loan $X for, say, three months, fund the loan 
by borrowing $X each day in the fed funds market and, finally, hedge the 
interest rate risk by purchasing an OIS contract (Gorton and Metrick 2009).
OIS rate is determined at the end of the business day, U.S. 
Eastern time.
Chart 3 illustrates the evolution of liquidity risk (the MBS-
Treasury repo spread) and credit risk (the CDX IG index and 
Libor quote dispersion) during the crisis, along with the Libor-
OIS spread. All values are in basis points. The evolution of risk 
proxies is consistent with the view that, at the beginning of the 
crisis, liquidity risk was relatively more important than credit 
risk, but credit risk became more prominent as the crisis 
progressed, gaining particular importance after April 2008 and 
especially during September 2008. The initial months of the 
crisis were characterized by large spikes in liquidity risk, but 
only a modest rise in credit risk. After April 2008, however, 
liquidity risk fell while the CDX spread remained elevated. 
After mid-September 2008, both types of risk increased, but the 
two credit risk proxies increased relatively more and remained 
elevated longer.
The Libor-OIS spread appears to co-move with both the 
credit and liquidity risk variables during the crisis period. We 
examine changes in the spread more formally in the next 
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8. Effectiveness of the Fed’s 
Liquidity Supply: Methodology
Here, we investigate the relationship between the Libor-OIS 
spread and the supply of funds through the Federal Reserve’s 
TAF and swap facilities. We focus on the latter facilities because 
they are the longest running new programs introduced during 
the crisis, and because both were meant to provide dollar 
funding to the interbank markets (in contrast to other stage-
one liquidity programs, such as the TSLF).
We interpret the TAF and swap programs as primarily 
intending to decrease liquidity risk. Because the Libor-OIS 
spread contains credit and noncredit risk components, we 
control for credit risk to obtain meaningful correlations 
between the spread and the supply of funds by the Fed. To 
isolate the supply effects, we consider changes in the amount 
of funds outstanding, which are the net effect of changes in 
the Fed’s supply of funds and repayment of funds by 
participating banks. During the first ten months of TAF 
operation, the Fed raised the maximum amount offered at 
auction four times, introduced longer term auctions, and 
increased the frequency of auctions. The swap facility 
underwent similar changes, such as increases in size and 
adjustments in frequency. These changes worked mainly to 
increase the size of the programs; more recently, the Fed has 
been reducing their size.
Our maintained assumption is that changes in the TAF and 
in the swap amount outstanding are exogenous. Before 
October 2008, the Fed and other central banks determined the 
maximum offering amount for the TAF and the swap lines well 
in advance of the auctions, and banks fully subscribed to each 
auction. Thus, changes in the amount outstanding for these 
facilities were not influenced by market conditions concurrent 
with the supply announcement dates. Although the offer 
amounts were known in advance, uncertainty remained about 
whether the auctions would be fully subscribed; therefore, 
changes in the amount outstanding were not fully anticipated 
by banks. We calculate changes in the amount outstanding to 
occur on the day of disclosure rather than on the date of funds 
disbursement (generally two days later) to maximize the 
“news” content of our measure.
Since October 2008, the TAF offer amount was increased 
to $150 billion per auction and the auctions became 
undersubscribed. At almost the same time, the swap lines were 
uncapped and foreign banks were allowed to bid for any 
quantity of funds. These changes meant that market conditions 
around auction dates likely played a larger role in determining 
the actual amount of funds disbursed. For this reason, 
endogeneity problems are likely to be greater since October 
2008. To mitigate this concern, we include the Treasury-MBS 
general collateral repo spread to help control for changes in 
bank demand for TAF and swap loans.
McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) decompose the 
Libor-OIS spread into its credit risk and non–credit-risk 
components for the January 2007-April 2008 period. They 
find that the non–credit-risk component was the major part 
of the spread in 2007. The credit risk component was high 
and volatile in 2008. However, because the CDS market 
became highly illiquid at this time, part of the credit risk 
component is likely to reflect liquidity risk as well. 
Consistent with the importance of liquidity risk, the authors 
find that the Fed’s announcements of new supplies of TAF 
funds significantly reduced the Libor-OIS spread during 
their sample period.
Our analysis differs from that study’s approach in four 
primary respects. First, we use changes in the actual supply  
of funds through the TAF and swap facilities rather than 
announcement dates. The amount outstanding variable, being 
continuous, is able to capture variations in supply changes, 
unlike the auction date variables used by McAndrews, Sarkar, 
and Wang, which are binary. Second, our examination of a 
longer time series enables us to analyze recent decreases in  
the size of these facilities, potentially allowing us to draw 
implications for the Fed’s exit strategies. Third, we look at  
the TAF and swap facilities simultaneously, a natural approach 
because of the facilities’ high degree of similarity. Both are 
intended to provide dollar funding to a broad range of 
counterparties, both were introduced at the same time and 
relatively early in the crisis, and both correspond closely in 
terms of the timing, terms, and magnitude of auctions. Finally, 
we employ an expanded set of covariates to control for credit 
and liquidity risk.
We examine interactions between binary variables over four 
periods and the TAF and swap amounts outstanding to allow 
for changes in the importance of liquidity risk over time.31 The 
periods are chosen to correspond to the turning points of the 
crisis and to encompass TAF and swap auctions that occurred 
around these points. Period 1 starts on August 1, 2007, roughly 
the beginning of the crisis, and ends on March 9, 2008. Period 2 
begins on March 10, 2008, the date of the last TAF auction 
before the acquisition of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase, and 
ends on September 9, 2008. Period 3 captures the Lehman 
bankruptcy and its aftermath, beginning on September 10, 
2008, and ending on December 31, 2008. The final period runs 
from January 1, 2009, through July 31, 2009, a period when 
markets were normalizing.
31 The effect of risk variables on the Libor-OIS spread could also change over 
time. Unreported results from regressions allowing the risk variable 
coefficients to vary over different crisis periods indicate no qualitative changes 
to our estimates for the amounts outstanding of the TAF and swap variables.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2010 67
We estimate the following equation, whereΔ  is the daily 
change in the variable: 















β10ΔCDX t β11ΔLIBOR DISPt – ++
β12ΔVIX t β13ΔMBS TRSY REPOt – – ++
εt + .
The equation relates changes in the Libor-OIS spread to 
changes in the amounts outstanding at the Fed’s TAF (denoted 
ΔTAF) and swap (denoted ΔSWAP) facilities. We control for 
credit risk using the CDX index  ΔCDX ()  and the Libor quote 
dispersion variable (ΔLIBOR DISP – ). We control for general 
market risk using options-implied volatility in the equity 
market (ΔVIX). Because VIX has been found to be a 
significant determinant of asset prices in several markets, we 
use it to account for financial market risk broadly.32 Finally, we 
control for banks’ balance-sheet funding risk using the overnight 
MBS-Treasury repo spread (ΔMBS TRSY REPO – – ). We use 
changes in variables to account for deterministic time-series 
effects, such as trends. All variables are summarized in Table 1. 
TAF auction results are from the Federal Reserve Board 
website; swap line results are from participating central bank 
websites.33 VIX data are from Bloomberg.
In a related regression, we decompose the TAF and swap 
line amounts outstanding into positive and negative changes. 
To be specific, we replaceΔTAF in equation 4 with the 
following terms:
ΔTAFP maxX0 ΔTAF , () = .  and ΔTAFN minN0 ΔTAF , () = . .
32 VIX has been shown to be a significant determinant of prices of foreign 
exchange (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen 2008) and sovereign CDS 
(Longstaff et al. 2007).
Table 1 
Variables Used in Regressions
Variable Description Unit
Three-month Libor-OIS spread on date t Three-month Libor on date t+1 minus three-month OIS rate on date t Basis points
TAF outstanding Outstanding value of TAF funds on award announcement date Billions of U.S. dollars
Non-negative component of TAF outstanding Equal to the maximum of TAF outstanding and 0  Billions of U.S. dollars
Non-positive component of TAF outstanding Minimum of 0 and TAF outstanding Billions of U.S. dollars
Swap outstanding Outstanding value of all swap lines on award announcement date Billions of U.S. dollars
Non-negative component of swap outstanding Maximum of swap outstanding and 0 Billions of U.S. dollars
Non-positive component of swap outstanding Minimum of 0 and swap outstanding Billions of U.S. dollars
Period 1 Binary variable equal to 1 for dates between August 1, 2007, 
  and March 9, 2008; 0 otherwise —
Period 2 Binary variable equal to 1 for dates between March 10, 2008, 
  and September 9, 2008; 0 otherwise —
Period 3 Binary variable equal to 1 for dates between September 10, 2008, 
  and December 31, 2008; 0 otherwise —
Period 4 Binary variable equal to 1 for dates between January 2, 2009, 
  and July 31, 2009; 0 otherwise —
CDX spread CDX IG index Basis points
Three-month Libor quote dispersion on date t Difference between maximum and minimum quote of banks in three-month 
  Libor panel on date t+1
Basis points
VIX Options-implied volatility in equities market Basis points
Overnight MBS–Treasury spread Overnight MBS rate minus Treasury general collateral repo rate Basis points
Note: Libor is the London interbank offered rate; TAF is the Term Auction Facility; MBS is mortgage-backed securities.68 Financial Amplification Mechanisms
Further, we replaceΔSWAP in equation 4 with the 
following terms:
ΔSWAPP maxX0 ΔSWAP , () = . , and 
ΔSWAPN minX0 ΔSWAP , () = . .
The balance-sheet constraint is predicted to bind on the 
down side (when intermediaries are capital constrained) but 
not on the up side (when capital is widely available). This 
predicted asymmetry implies that increases in the supply of 
funds by the Fed should decrease spreads, whereas reductions 
in the supply should have little impact on them.
9. The Effectiveness of the Fed’s 
Liquidity Supply: Results
Table 2 presents our results from estimating equation 4. The 
results indicate that the supply of funds from both the TAF and 
the swap line programs was associated with a reduction in the 
Libor-OIS spread during the early phase of the crisis (up to 
March 9, 2008). In particular, an increase of $1 billion in the 
supply of TAF and swap line funds outstanding is associated 
with an average decline in the spread of 0.1 to 0.5 basis point 
during this period. This result is consistent with the operation 
of the balance-sheet amplification mechanism in the early stage 
of the crisis.
We find that in subsequent periods, the supply of TAF and 
swap funds is not a significant predictor of the interest rate 
spread. The sign of the TAF supply coefficient remains negative 
in Periods 2 and 3, but it is not significant.34 In the next section, 
we show that this apparent lack of significance may be 
attributable to an averaging of the separate effects of increases 
and decreases in the supply of funds. The sign of the swap line 
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34 The difference between the TAF coefficient in the early crisis period (Period 1) 
and Period 2 is not statistically significant, but the Period 1 coefficient is 
significantly different from the estimates for Periods 3 and 4. The early crisis 
swap coefficient is significantly different from all later swap coefficients. 
Table 2 
Changes in Amounts Outstanding at Federal 
Reserve Facilities, and the Libor-OIS Spread 
August 2007-July 2009
Dependent Variable: Change in Three-Month Libor-OIS Spread
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient
Change in TAF outstanding
Period 1: August 1, 2007–March 9, 2008 -0.130***
(0.037)
Period 2: March 10, 2008–September 9, 2008 -0.167
(0.110)
Period 3: September 10, 2008–December 31, 2008 -0.031
(0.036)
Period 4: January 2, 2009–July 31, 2009 0.009
(0.018)
Change in swap outstanding
Period 1: August 1, 2007–March 9, 2008 -0.481***
(0.150)
Period 2: March 10, 2008–September 9, 2008 0.048
(0.065)
Period 3: September 10, 2008–December 31, 2008 -0.047
(0.064)
Period 4: January 2, 2009–July 31, 2009 0.019
(0.016)
Credit risk 
Change in CDX spread 0.140***
(0.042)
Change in three-month Libor quote dispersion 0.160***
(0.050)
Liquidity risk
Change in overnight MBS–Treasury spread 0.025*
(0.014)
Market risk






Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the British Bankers’ 
Association, Haver Analytics, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, foreign central banks, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, and Markit.
Notes: Newey-West standard errors (five lags) are in parentheses. The full 
sample is daily observations from January 3, 2007, to July 31, 2009. TAF 
is the Term Auction Facility. See Table 1 for a description of variables.
*** p<0.01.
  ** p<0.05.
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the TAF and swap line results together, we conclude that the 
supply of liquidity by the Fed was most effective in the early 
stages of the crisis and the effectiveness moderated over time.
The credit risk variables are of the expected sign, with the 
Libor quote dispersion and the CDX spread being positively 
and significantly associated with the Libor-OIS spread. A 
1 basis point change in either credit risk variable is associated 
with about a 0.15 basis point change in the Libor-OIS spread.35 
The overnight repo spread is also positively associated with the 
Libor-OIS spread during the crisis, but the estimate is only 
significant at the 10 percent level. As we discussed, the marginal 
significance of the repo spread might be explained by the Fed’s 
action to reduce the spread through the PDCF and TSLF 
programs. Finally, changes in VIX are also significantly and 
positively associated with the Libor-OIS spread.36
Results from the regressions provide an indication of when 
the Fed might expect its liquidity facilities to help improve 
funding conditions. Comparing the coefficient estimates with 
the results in Chart 3, we observe that the facilities were most 
effective during periods of high liquidity risk and relatively low 
credit risk. The facilities did not appear to be effective during 
periods of extremely elevated credit risk, such as the months 
just after the Lehman failure in 2008, and during periods of low 
liquidity risk, such as the first half of 2009. This is consistent with 
the stated intentions of the TAF and swap facilities: to provide 
short-term funding to banks. As such, these facilities were not 
expected to have a direct effect on the credit risk of banks.
10. Asymmetric Market Responses 
to the Fed’s Liquidity Supply
We next report estimates using TAF and swap outstanding 
variables decomposed into positive and negative changes. 
Chart 4 presents the time-series plots of the two main variables 
of interest: changes in TAF and swap amounts outstanding. 
Note that the TAF has experienced negative changes in 
amounts outstanding since Period 3, while the swap lines have 
experienced both increases and decreases during each period 
since the crisis began. The share of negative changes in the TAF 
and swap lines combined, compared with the total number of 
changes, is small in Periods 1 and 2, and rises to 40 percent in 
Period 3 and 80 percent in Period 4.
35 Similar specifications with indexes of Libor bank CDS spreads instead of the 
CDX index yielded highly similar results for the TAF and swap variables of 
interest, but results for the Libor-based indexes were insignificant.
36 We also considered the term premium, defined as the spread between the 
five- and two-year on-the-run Treasury yields, but this variable was not a 
significant predictor of the Libor-OIS spread.
The results from estimation of the second regression are 
presented in Table 3. Symmetric responses of the Libor-OIS spread 
are indicated by negative changes to both increases and decreases 
in the amount outstanding—that is, reductions (increases) in the 
spread in response to a decrease (increase) in the amount 
outstanding. By comparison, asymmetric responses are indicated 
by different signs of the coefficient depending on whether the 
change in amount outstanding is positive or negative.
In the pre–Bear Stearns period (Period 1), expansion of the 
TAF and swap lines in the early part of the crisis tended to be 
associated with a reduction in the Libor-OIS spread, consistent 
with prior results. Further, reductions in the swap line amount 
outstanding resulted in an increase in the spread. Therefore, the 
effect of the Fed’s funds supply is symmetric during this period.
In contrast, during the post–Lehman periods (Periods 3 and 4), 
the effect of liquidity supply by the Fed is asymmetric.  
In particular, decreases in the TAF and swap amounts 
outstanding are associated with declines in the Libor-OIS 
spread, whereas increases in the TAF and swap lines are also 
associated with decreases in the spread during this period. 
These results are statistically significant for changes in the TAF 
amount outstanding. This asymmetry suggests that the lack of 
significance in the overall TAF coefficients during Periods 3 
and 4 in Table 2 may be attributable to an averaging of the 
positive and negative changes (which are of roughly equal 
magnitude). Hence, to understand responses of interest rates to 
changes in the supply of funds by the Fed during the post–
Lehman period, it is important to account for this asymmetry.
Chart 4
Changes in Term Auction Facility (TAF)
and Swap Line Amounts Outstanding
Billions of dollars











Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; foreign central banks.
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The existence of balance-sheet constraints that bind only on 
the downside implies a negative relationship between the 
Libor-OIS spread and positive changes in the TAF and swap 
lines and no relationship for negative changes. We find, 
however, that declines in the TAF amount outstanding actually 
improved the Libor-OIS spread in Periods 3 and 4. This 
association might reflect reduced pressure on funding markets 
at this time, leading to declining demand at the Fed facilities 
and a reduced spread. Indeed, the two declines in the TAF 
amount outstanding during Period 3 occur in December 2008, 
when risk factors were already beginning to normalize. In 
Chart 3, one can see that by December 2008 liquidity risk had 
declined, as had the Libor quote dispersion, although the CDX 
index had remained elevated.
The results in Table 3 also shed light on the Fed’s exit 
strategy from these programs. First, the decline in outstanding 
value that has occurred since the beginning of 2009 likely 
reflects a return by participants to market sources for funding 
as interbank market rates have fallen. Chart 2 supports this 
view by showing that the spread between Libor and the Fed 
facilities has been steadily decreasing since early 2009. The view 
is further supported by the coefficient estimates on the negative 
changes in the TAF and swap amounts outstanding in 2009 
(Table 3), indicating that the reductions in the programs were 
not adversely affecting market interest rates. This result 
represents a potentially positive sign for the market, as it 
indicates that reductions in the supply of funds by the Fed have 
not been a negative shock.
11. Conclusion
The financial crisis has led to large reductions in asset prices and 
in new issuances of primary securities while affecting a wide 
variety of markets and institutions. Yet the magnitude of these 
effects appears to be disproportionate to the relatively small 
losses that occurred in the subprime mortgage markets. To 
explain this seeming disparity, our paper surveys the literature 
on financial amplification mechanisms, focusing on the balance-
sheet and adverse-selection channels. It then discusses and 
interprets the Federal Reserve’s actions during the crisis in terms 
of the literature. We show that the Fed’s early-stage liquidity 
programs were mainly designed to dampen the balance-sheet 
amplification arising from the positive feedback between 
financial constraints and asset prices. The Fed’s later-stage crisis 
programs take into account the adverse-selection amplification 
that operates through increases in credit risk and the externality 
imposed by risky borrowers on safe ones.
Table 3 
Positive and Negative Changes in Amounts 
Outstanding at Federal Reserve Facilities 
August 2007-July 2009
Dependent Variable: Change in Three-Month Libor-OIS Spread
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient
Positive changes in TAF outstanding
Period 1: August 1, 2007–March 9, 2008 -0.093**
(0.045)
Period 2: March 10, 2008–September 9, 2008 -0.033
(0.078)
Period 3: September 10, 2008–December 31, 2008 -0.134***
(0.020)
Period 4: January 2, 2009–July 31, 2009 -0.108**
(0.045)
Negative changes in TAF outstanding
Period 3: September 10, 2008–December 31, 2008 0.150***
(0.016)
Period 4: January 2, 2009–July 31, 2009 0.034**
(0.015)
Positive changes in swap outstanding
Period 1: August 1, 2007–March 9, 2008 -0.957***
(0.050)
Period 2: March 10, 2008–September 9, 2008 0.036
(0.066)
Period 3: September 10, 2008–December 31, 2008 -0.084
(0.083)
Period 4: January 2, 2009–July 31, 2009 0.204
(0.161)
Negative changes in swap outstanding
Period 1: August 1, 2007–March 9, 2008 -0.304***
(0.036)
Period 2: March 10, 2008–September 9, 2008 -0.087*
(0.050)
Period 3: September 10, 2008–December 31, 2008 0.063
(0.045)




Risk variables included? Yes
Adjusted R2 0.19
Observations 475
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the British Bankers’ 
Association, Haver Analytics, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, foreign central banks, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, and Markit.
Notes: Newey-West standard errors (five lags) are in parentheses. Nega-
tive changes in TAF outstanding did not occur until Period 2. The full 
sample is daily observations from January 3, 2007, to July 31, 2009. TAF 
is the Term Auction Facility. See Table 1 for a description of variables.
*** p<0.01.
  ** p<0.05.
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We also examine how changes in the Fed’s supply of 
liquidity (the amount of funds outstanding at the TAF and 
swap facilities) are associated with changes in interest rate 
spreads, after controlling for credit risk and short-term funding 
conditions. We find that an increase in the supply of funds is 
associated with a reduction in the Libor-OIS spread early in the 
crisis. During more recent periods, the Fed has been gradually 
withdrawing funds from these programs. We find that the 
reduced supply of funds has had no significant impact on 
interest rate spreads in these periods. These results suggest that 
the potential withdrawal of liquidity by the Fed may not have 
an adverse effect on market prices.References
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